We examine whether Basu's (1997) differential timeliness metric and the related C-Score metric are effective in detecting predictable differences in conservatism surrounding corrections of overstated earnings. Cross-sectional and time-series analyses, employing 2132 firms making restatements during 1999-2005, suggest Basubased metrics capture variation in conservatism. Further, we find that increases in conservatism following restatements are contingent on improvements in corporate governance. Collectively, these results provide evidence of the usefulness of the Basubased metrics in the restatement setting.
critiques of the DT measure (GHN, 2007; Dietrich et al., 2007; Patoukas and Thomas, 2011) , Ball et al. (2011) recently call for new evidence on the usefulness of the measure. They note that the importance of the Basu-based conservatism literature, together with the recommendation by some critics that its results be discarded, make the issue worthy of further study.
This study provides new evidence assessing the usefulness of Basu-based metrics, including DT and the related Khan and Watts (2009) C-Score, in detecting situational non-conservative income recognition. Consistent with the literature, we use a Basu-based earnings metric model, with negative market returns as proxy for firms likely to have bad news about expected future losses from assets (Basu, 1997; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; LaFond and Watts, 2008) . We revisit the issue raised by GHN, motivated in part by the large number of restatements that have occurred since their sample period of [2000] [2001] and by the importance of misstatements (and subsequent restatements) as accounting events. We focus on the predominant type of restatements, those that correct previous overstatements of earnings. We employ a maximum sample of 2132 restatements correcting overstated earnings during the period 1999-2005. We find that Basu's DT conservatism metric is significantly lower for test firms in periods of overstated earnings than for control firms during the same periods. We also investigate whether estimated DT parameters indicate test firms' earnings are significantly more conservative in post-overstatement periods than during periods of earnings overstatements. Using both a cross-sectional design and a time-series design, we find that they are. Further, we test the ability of the Khan and Watts (2009) C-Score metric to detect variation in conservatism. That metric is derived from the Basu (1997) DT metric but has the advantage that it is estimated for individual companies and individual years. We find that the C-Score is effective in detecting lower conservatism in the years of overstated earnings and higher conservatism subsequent to overstatements.
Companies' earnings are expected to be more conservative after managers stop overstating. In addition to this passive, definitional increase in conservatism, managers and directors of restating companies have strong incentives to actively ensure that post-restatement earnings are conservative, in order to repair their reputations for good management and corporate governance (Farber, 2005) . 1 In additional analyses we investigate the extent to which our test companies engage in changes to corporate governance and whether changes often viewed as improvements in governance are associated with greater increases in earnings conservatism. Using both Basu's DT metric and the C-Score metric, we observe a pronounced increase in conservatism for firms that experience improved corporate governance, consistent with results previously documented by Ahmed and Duellman (2007) . This study contributes to the literature by responding to the call of Ball et al. (2011) for new research to address the question whether Basu-based metrics such as the DT metric and the C-Score are useful proxies for earnings conservatism. Overall, our results provide new evidence on the effectiveness of Basu-based metrics in capturing variation in conservatism in the restatement setting. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on earnings conservatism and earnings restatements. Section 3 presents the research design and describes the sample. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the main empirical results. Section 6 provides additional analyses. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Background
Financial accounting is conservative if it requires greater verifiability for the accounting recognition of gains versus losses, thus generating an understatement of net assets relative to market-assessed values (Basu, 1997; LaFond and Watts, 2008) . Numerous empirical studies have been conducted using Basu's (1997) DT measure of conservatism and their findings are consistent with credible theories (Ball et al., 2011) . For example, research finds that conservative reporting protects investors by mitigating agency problems between managers and investors (Watts, 2003; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Ramalingegowda and Yu, in press ). Managers have greater incentives to report less verifiable gains, but are reluctant to report less verifiable losses. Watts (2003) and LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that conservatism requires managers to recognize economic losses in a timelier manner than economic gains, and thus protects investors by limiting managers' ability to obtain excessive compensation based on overstated earnings. Consistent with this view, LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) and LaFond and Watts (2008) find greater conservatism among firms that are likely to have more agency problems. 2 Among recent papers that challenge the usefulness of Basu's DT measure, Givoly, Hayn and Natarajan (GHN, 2007) provide a useful approach for evaluating the measure. Rather than seeking to identify econometric bias in the DT measure, GHN assume the measure is valid, and then investigate whether empirical evidence supports its validity. Their approach indicates whether any bias is sufficient to render Basu-based metrics invalid in particular research settings, including 1 Subsequent to restatements, investors respond to the revelation of a company's prior earnings overstatements by penalizing the company in various ways, such as negative stock returns, increases in costs of capital, and lawsuits. find that restatements generate substantial declines in stock prices, followed by decreases in expected earnings and increased cost of capital (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004) and lawsuits .
2 Also see Kothari et al. (2010) for an extensive overview of the economic role of conservative reporting. Individual studies documenting benefits of conservative financial reporting include Ahmed et al. (2002) , Francis et al. (2004) , Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) , Beatty et al. (2008) earnings restatements. They argue that a valid conservatism metric should detect lower conservatism for periods when earnings are known to have been managed upward. Upward manipulation has clearly occurred among firms that subsequently restate their earnings downward. The authors find that a sample of companies that restate earnings downward in 2000 or 2001 exhibit similar DT metrics for the presumed misstatement years as for prior reporting years. They also find that the test companies exhibit significantly greater conservatism during the misstatement years compared to control companies of similar size and in the same industry during the same years. In summary, GHN find that a hypothesis of DT validity is inconsistent with evidence that the measure is unable to detect non-conservative reporting in periods when it is known to have occurred. We revisit GHN's restatement setting because it is useful for investigating the validity of Basu-based metrics, and because earnings overstatements and restatements are important accounting events. The number of firms issuing earnings restatements has increased dramatically since the late 1990s (Scholz, 2008) , and as well as since GHN's sample period of 2000 and 2001. The adverse consequences following restatement announcements are well documented in the literature (Government Accountability Office, hereafter GAO, 2003; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Srinivasan, 2005) . Stock prices decrease when restatements are first announced to the public (GAO, 2003; . Restatements result in an increase in the firm's cost of equity capital (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004) . In addition, outside directors suffer high turnover and labor market penalties (Srinivasan, 2005) , and restatements increase the incidence of shareholder lawsuits .
The negative consequences of restatements provide incentives to improve corporate governance and internal controls that might prevent future earnings errors. Farber (2005) finds that companies whose managers have committed financial reporting fraud take actions to improve their governance following fraud detection. Srinivasan (2005) finds that outside directors, especially audit committee members, are more likely to be replaced after restatements. Desai et al. (2006) document that managers of restating companies face an increased likelihood of job loss. Both corporate boards and the external labor market impose significant penalties on managers for violating Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Given this prior evidence of changes in corporate governance among firms restating earnings, we undertake additional analyses to determine whether changes in corporate governance are associated with increases in conservatism among test firms.
Research design and sample selection

The Basu conservatism metric
Basu's (1997) differential timeliness (DT) metric is the most commonly used proxy for conservatism, and is the primary conservatism metric investigated in this study. Conservatism is measured as the extent to which negative returns (bad news) are reflected in reported earnings more rapidly than positive returns (good news). The Basu model is as follows:
In Eq. (1), NI it is the scaled net income for year t; RET it is the stock return over year t; and NEG it is defined as zero if RET it is positive, and as one if RET it is negative. Coefficient a 2 is the slope coefficient for positive RET it ; the slope coefficient for negative RET it is a 2 þa 3 ; and a 3 is the differential slope for bad versus good economic news (differential timeliness, DT). Earnings are conservative if net income is more sensitive to bad news than to good news, that is, if a 3 is positive.
See Appendix for the definitions of all the variables.
Two sampling approaches
We employ two sampling approaches to investigate whether the test companies' Basu-based metrics reflect changes in conservatism surrounding overstatement years. See Fig. 1 for a graphic illustration. The first, cross-sectional approach compares the earnings conservatism of two samples: restating (test) companies and matching non-restating (control) companies. Each restating company is matched with a portfolio of non-restating companies having similar characteristics during the pre-overstatement period. We then compare the conservatism metrics of test companies and control companies (i) in years when test firms' earnings were overstated and (ii) in years subsequent to overstatements. If the Basu-based metrics are valid, they should detect lower conservatism for test companies during the years of overstatements. The metrics should indicate test companies report at least as conservatively as control companies in the post-periods. This cross-sectional approach has the advantage that it controls for any economy-wide changes in conservatism over time.
The second, time-series approach compares the restating companies' earnings conservatism in the years when earnings were overstated to that in the post-overstatement years. This approach has the advantage that each test company serves as its own control. We contrast overstatement periods with post-rather than with pre-overstatement periods for two reasons. First, periods in which earnings overstatements violate GAAP are typically preceded by one to three years during which managers manipulate earnings upward, but within the bounds of GAAP (Ettredge et al., 2010) . This manipulation in the pre-overstatement periods biases against the detection of conservatism differences between the pre-overstatement and overstatement periods. Second, managers' incentives to report conservatively are stronger after they have publicly corrected prior overstatements of earnings. Given that we maintain the hypothesis that test companies' reporting is less conservative during the overstatement period, we choose the post-period for comparison since it is more consistent (than the pre-period) with our maintained hypothesis.
The cross-sectional model
This section describes the cross-sectional model we use with both the test (restating) and control sample data to estimate the Basu DT metric. To capture differences in conservatism between the test and control companies, we extend model (1) by including the variable TESTFIRM it , coded as one for a test company i in period t, and as zero for company i's matching control firm(s) in period t. For convenience we designate the test firm overstatement periods as t ¼T, and periods subsequent to the test firm overstatement periods as t ¼Tþ t. Test firms are matched with control firms in the years just prior to the onset of overstatements, as shown in Fig. 1 . We contrast the test and control companies during both the periods t ¼T and t ¼Tþt. The expanded model is Test firm conservatism level Control firm conservatism level 3 Conservatism should increase passively (i.e., by definition) when overstatements end. As Fig. 1 indicates, restatements can occur subsequent to the end of overstatements. Managers' incentives to actively ensure more conservative accounting arguably begin when overstatements have been publicly announced via restatements. Given that both the passive and active effects should increase conservatism, and given that restatements often occur at the end of the overstatement periods, we do not distinguish empirically between the pre-restatement and post-restatement components of the postoverstatement period.
political costs, aggregation of income and returns across multiple segments and projects, and information asymmetry. Leverage, LEV, represents lenders' demand for conservatism (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008) . The market-to-book equity ratio, MTB, reflects the extent to which the book value of equity understates market value (Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007) . Litigation risk, LIT, provides managers with incentives to practice conservative recognition of economic losses (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008) .
The time-series model
This section describes the model we use with the test firm sample data to estimate the Basu DT metric. To capture higher conservatism in post-overstatement periods, we extend model (1) by including the variable POST it , equal to one for test firm i if year t is in a post-overstatement period, and zero otherwise:
This model is estimated using only test (restatement) firms. Coefficient a 3 represents conservatism in the baseline overstatement period, t¼T. We expect a 7 to be positive, reflecting greater conservatism in the post-overstatement period, t¼Tþt.
Restatement sample selection
Our sample includes firms that disclose a single restatement during January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2005. We identify our restatement sample from several sources. First, we use Audit Analytics to identify firms that report restatements during the years 2000-2005. Second, we include restatements identified by using an extensive key-word (e.g., restat, revis, adjust, error) search in the Lexis-Nexis Library and the U. The restatements studied in this paper are limited to the correction of errors and irregularities in the application of U.S. GAAP in public company financial statements filed with the SEC. 6 To clearly distinguish between pre-and postoverstatement periods, we restrict the test sample to companies that experience only one restatement in the sample period, although the restatement can correct errors in more than one prior year. Multiple disclosures concerning one restatement event are treated as one restatement. We also require test companies to have at least one year of data available both before and after the overstatement years. These requirements result in a maximum sample of 2293 restatement firms. Prior research documents that approximately 90 percent of restatements affect previously reported net income (Scholz, 2008) . Furthermore, 80-90 percent of earnings restatements have the effect of decreasing previously overstated net income. The preponderance of income-decreasing restatements in the entire restatement sample suggests that many errors are due to aggressive income recognition. Income-increasing restatements are more likely to correct unintentional errors. To further strengthen our maintained hypothesis that conservatism increases in the post-misstatement periods, we focus on earnings overstatements, that is, restatements that decrease previously reported earnings. In our overall restatement sample of 2293 restatements from 1999 to 2005, about 93 percent are income decreasing (N ¼ 2132) and about 7 percent are income increasing (N ¼ 161).
7 Panel A of Table 1 Table 1 shows that test companies' characteristics between the overstatement periods (t ¼T) and the postoverstatement periods (t ¼Tþ t) do not change significantly over time 8 (see the timeline in Fig. 1 ). 4 We are grateful to Susan Scholz for providing this database of restatements and guidance on identifying restatement samples. 5 The overlapping periods are used to validate both data sources. 6 Restatements made to correct content other than errors in financial statements were eliminated from our sample. For example, some companies use the word ''restate'' to present changes in accounting principles or retrospective revisions to enhance the consistency of their financial information. Restatements made by foreign filers to reformulate financial information under U.S. GAAP were also eliminated. 7 When a test company restates income for more than a single year, we classify it as having overstated its income, if the net effect of errors across previous years was to overstate income. 8 Throughout our analysis, we winsorize continuous variables at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels.
Cross-sectional test results
Cross-sectional results for overstatement periods (T)
To test whether test firms report less conservatively than control firms during overstatement periods (t ¼T), we estimate Eq. (2) using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with cross-sectional data pooled over years. We conduct all OLS regression tests using standard errors clustered at the year and firm levels (Gow et al., 2010) . To match control firms to test firms, we use the year-end data prior to the overstatement periods based on three different matching methods. In the first control sample each restatement company is matched to the control company closest in size (total assets). This differs from GHN (2007) who choose two control companies that are closest in size. We think that one-to-one matching is more commonly used in prior studies (Kothari et al., 2005; Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009 ).
9
The second control sample consists of companies in the same industries as their matching test companies, and of similar size and profitability. Similar to GHN (2007) , the control companies are identified as those in each restatement company's two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry group that are within 710 percent of the restatement company's asset size and within 720 percent of its return on assets (ROA). The third control sample consists of companies in the same industries as the test companies and of similar conservatism levels. The control companies are identified as those in each restatement company's two-digit SIC industry group that are within 720 percent of the restatement company's conservatism level. Following Francis et al. (2004) , we estimate a company's conservatism level for each year using model (1) and a window of 10 prior-year observations. We define each company's conservatism level for a year equal to its estimated model (1) DT coefficient a 3 for that year.
10
Although we form our control samples similarly to GHN, our tests differ from theirs in two respects. First, we use a much larger sample of companies making restatements in the period 1999-2005, compared to GHN's sample of restatements made only in 2000 and 2001. Second, we identify exactly when the earnings overstatements occurred, instead of assuming that they occurred in all three years prior to restatements. The sample period is from 1996 to 2006. The p-values for differences in means are based on two-tailed t-tests, adjusted for both time-series and cross-sectional correlations by clustering at the year and firm levels. The variables are defined in the Appendix.
Columns (1)- (3) in Table 2 report the estimation results for model (2). 11 We find that the conservatism parameters for the control companies (see the coefficients for RET it Â NEG it ), are 0.2963 in column (1), 0.2999 in column (2), and 0.2977 in column (3). All three are highly significant and indicate Basu-type conservatism for the control companies. Importantly, the almost identical estimated Basu-based DT parameters for the control firms indicate that the parameters are not very sensitive to how control firms are chosen. We also find that the test companies' incremental conservatism parameters compared to the control firm conservatism parameters (see the coefficients for TESTFIRM it Â RET it Â NEG it ) are negative and significantly different from zero in all three columns of Table 2 . These results indicate that Basu-based conservatism of test companies in the overstatement years is significantly lower than for control companies of similar size (column (1)); for control companies in the same industry, and of similar size and profitability (column (2)); and for control companies in the same industry and having similar conservatism levels in the pre-overstatement periods (column (3)).
Cross-sectional results for post-overstatement periods (Tþ t)
The next analysis investigates whether test firms report more conservatively than control firms in the postoverstatement periods (t ¼Tþt). Using a four-way matching procedure, we match test firms with control firms from The sample period is from 1996 to 2006. The models are estimated using a pooled OLS regression. The dependent variable is NI it , net income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t. The variable TESTFIRM it is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is a test (restatement) firm, and zero if a control firm. In column (1), each control firm is matched to the test firm with the closest total asset in the year prior to the overstatement period. In column (2), the control firm is matched by similar total asset, within 710 percent of the test firm's total asset; similar ROA, within 720 percent of the test firm's ROA; and two-digit SIC industry code to a test firm in the year prior to the overstatement period. In column (3), the control firm is matched by the similar conservatism level (within 720 percent of the test firm's conservatism level) and two-digit SIC industry code to a test firm in the year prior to overstatement period. The other variables are defined in the Appendix. We calculate the t-statistics using standard errors clustered at the year and firm levels, with two-tailed t-tests. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
the same industries and of similar size, profitability, and conservatism levels. In the year prior to the overstatement periods, we require the control firms and the corresponding test firms to be in the same industry, in the same quartile group of total assets, in the same quartile group of ROA, and in the same quartile group of conservatism levels. We estimate Eq. (2) in a pooled OLS regression using data observations after overstatements. Table 3 presents the estimation results. We find that the coefficient of RET it Â NEG it for control companies is significantly positive, and the coefficient of TESTFIRM it Â RET it Â NEG it is also positive and highly significant. The former result indicates that companies in the matching control group practice conservative income recognition policies in the post-periods, based on Basu's DT parameter. The latter result indicates that test companies report more conservatively than their peer control companies in the post-overstatement periods.
Cross-sectional results using Khan and Watts (2009) C-Score
In this section we use the Khan and Watts (2009) measure of conservatism, the C-Score, to investigate the crosssectional differences in conservatism surrounding overstatements. We begin by estimating a model similar to that reported in Khan and Watts' (2009) Table 9 . This model explains variance in C-Score it using measures of stock return volatility (RETVOLA it ), investment cycle (INVCYCLE it ), age (FIRMAGE it ), and bid-ask spread (SPREAD it ). Based on Khan and Watts' theory and results, the variables RETVOLA it and SPREAD it should have positive associations with the conservatism metric, and INVCYCLE it and FIRMAGE it should have negative coefficients. To control for litigation risk, we add to the model a dichotomous variable, equal to one for a year-to-year increase in litigation probability (LITPROB_CHG it À 1 ), and zero otherwise. 12 We expect it to have a positive association with the conservatism metric. 
Number of observations 1947
The sample period is from 1996 to 2006. The models are estimated using an OLS pooled regression. The dependent variable is NI it , net income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t. The variable TESTFIRM it is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is a test (restatement) firm, and zero if a control firm. The control firm is matched by similar size (in the same total asset quartile group), similar return on assets (in the same ROA quartile group), similar conservatism level (in the same conservatism DT quartile group), and two-digit SIC industry code to a test firm in the year prior to the overstatement period. The other variables are defined in the Appendix. We calculate the t-statistics using standard errors clustered at the year and firm levels, with two-tailed t-tests. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
12 The annual litigation probability is obtained using the estimated parameters in Table 3 of Shu (2000) . See Appendix for the definition of the variable.
Consistent with our previous procedures, we require test companies to have (i) only one restatement during our sample period, and (ii) at least one observation in the pre-and post-overstatement periods. Similar to the approach used in Table 3 , the test and control companies are matched by industry, size, ROA, and conservatism level (i.e., C-Score) in the year prior to the overstatement period. We also require the test and control companies to have the necessary data from Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to calculate C-Scores and control variables. To capture differences in conservatism between the test and control firms, we add the variable TESTFIRM it to the model, equal to one for test companies and zero for control companies. We expect the variable to have a negative association with C-Score it during the overstatement periods (t ¼T) and a positive association in the post-overstatement periods (t¼T þt).
Panel A of Table 4 shows descriptive statistics. The univariate tests indicate that test firms have lower C-Scores and greater firm age than control firms during the overstatement periods. Panel B of Table 4 reports the OLS regression results using data pooled over years. We find that the coefficient of TESTFIRM it is negative and highly significant, indicating lower conservatism for the test firms than for the control firms in the years T, when overstatements occurred. Panel C of Table 4   Table 4 Cross-sectional C-Score model comparison of test firms with matched firms. The sample period is from 1996 to 2006. The p-values for differences in means in Panel A are based on two-tailed t-tests, adjusted for both time-series and crosssectional correlations by clustering by the year and firm levels. The models in Panels B and C are estimated using an OLS pooled regression. The dependent variable is C-Score it , the conservatism score estimated using the variables from Table 3 of Khan and Watts (2009) . The variable TESTFIRM it is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is a test (restatement) firm, and zero if a control firm. The control firm is matched by similar size (in the same asset quartile group), similar return on assets (in the same ROA quartile group), similar conservatism level (in the same C-Score quartile group), and two-digit SIC industry code to a test firm in the year prior to the overstatement period. The other variables are defined in the Appendix. We calculate the t-statistics using standard errors clustered at the year and firm levels, with two-tailed t-tests. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
reports the cross-sectional comparison of conservatism between the test firms and control firms in the post-overstatement periods (t ¼Tþ t). We find that the coefficient of TESTFIRM it is positive and highly significant, indicating that the C-Score conservatism of test firms is higher than that of control firms in the years after the overstatement periods. To summarize, our results using the C-Score as proxy for reporting conservatism are similar to those obtained using Basu's (1997) DT metric. The C-Score metric detects lower conservatism among test firms than among control firms during overstatement periods, and higher conservatism in the post-overstatement periods. The test and control firms are matched by size, industry, profitability, and conservatism in the pre-overstatement periods. The C-Score results, together with the DT results reported in this section, are consistent with these measures capturing predictable variation in conservatism.
Time-series test results
Time-series results using the Basu DT model
To test whether the Basu-based conservatism coefficients of our test companies differ between the years when they overstate earnings (t¼ T), and those subsequent to the overstatements (t ¼Tþt), we estimate a variant of model (3) using only test firm data pooled across years. All years in the pre-overstatement period are deleted for this test. Table 5 presents the regression estimation results. We find that the coefficient of RET it Â NEG it is significantly positive and, more importantly, the coefficient of POST it Â RET it Â NEG it is positive and highly significant. These results indicate that in the post-overstatement period, test companies report more conservatively than in the overstatement period, as earnings become asymmetrically timelier in recognizing bad news.
Time-series results using Khan and Watts (2009) C-Score
We estimate the Khan and Watts (2009) model previously introduced in Section 4.3 using test company observations during and after the years when earnings are overstated. We add the variable POST it to the model to investigate whether test companies increase their conservatism in the post-overstatement period (t¼Tþt), relative to the overstatement-period Table 5 Time-series comparison of test firms during post-overstatement (t¼ Tþt) and overstatement periods (t ¼T).
Dependent ¼NI it
Predicted sign
Coef. 
Number of observations 2721
The sample period is from 1996 to 2006. The model is estimated using an OLS pooled regression. The dependent variable is NI it , net income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t. The variable POST it is an indicator variable equal to one if year t of test firm i is in the post-overstatement period, and zero otherwise. The other variables are defined in the Appendix. We calculate the t-statistics using standard errors clustered at the year and firm levels, with two-tailed t-tests.
The superscript ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
(t¼T). If so, POST it should be positively associated with C-SCORE it . The results are provided in Table 6 . As expected, the coefficient of POST it is positive and highly significant. To summarize the results of Sections 4 and 5, we find that in cross-sectional tests, the test (restatement) companies report less conservatively than similar control companies during the years when earnings are overstated. The test companies report more conservatively than the control companies following overstatement periods. Further, in time-series tests, the restatement companies report more conservatively during post-overstatement years than during the years when earnings are overstated.
In an additional analysis (untabulated), we do not find a significant difference in test firm conservatism between the pre-overstatement and the overstatement periods using our test sample. This result is consistent with GHN. A possible explanation for the lack of difference is that an earnings overstatement is typically preceded by one to three years of aggressive reporting of earnings that remains within the bounds of GAAP (Ettredge et al., 2010) . This activity biases against researchers' abilities to detect differences in the earnings aggressiveness of the test firms between the misstatement years and the immediately preceding years. Thus we believe the comparison between the overstatement and post-overstatement periods is more appropriate for testing the Basu DT model. In summary, the differences between our study and prior studies are (i) our use of a much larger sample of restating firms, (ii) our ability to identify exactly when overstatements occurred, and (iii) our investigation of conservatism in postoverstatement periods (t¼Tþ t), when the managers of test firms have the strongest incentives to report conservatively.
In addition, (iv) we employ models that are more extensive, for example, than those employed in GHN, thus controlling for more company characteristics. Finally, (v) we employ an alternative Basu-based metric, the C-Score, and use control samples matched with test firms on the metrics of size, industry, profitability, and conservatism in the pre-overstatement periods.
Changes in corporate governance
The results reported in the main analyses provide evidence that Basu-based conservatism metrics detect increases in the conservatism of test companies' earnings after overstatement periods. This may be due in part to improvements in corporate governance. Prior research finds that outside directors on audit committees suffer high turnover and labor market penalties following corrections of earnings overstatements (Srinivasan, 2005) . Ahmed and Duellman (2007) argue that conservatism is higher in companies with stronger boards of directors. This section investigates whether improvements in restating companies' corporate governance are associated with a detectable increase in conservatism.
We examine the association using two subsets of the test companies: those that improve their governance from the preto post-restatement periods, and those that do not. Several prior studies (Farber, 2005; Srinivasan, 2005; Desai et al., 2006) suggest that companies take action to improve corporate governance after the public disclosure of a restatement, rather than at the possibly earlier end of an overstatement period. To be consistent with these studies, we use the restatement disclosure year instead of the last year of the misstatement period as the cut-off date for examining governance improvement. 13 We expect to observe that the increase in conservatism is stronger for ''improved'' companies than for ''unimproved'' ones. The sample period is from 1996 to 2006. The models are estimated using an OLS pooled regression. The dependent variable is C-Score it , the conservatism score estimated using the variables from Table 3 of Khan and Watts (2009) . The variable POST it is an indicator variable equal to one if year t of test firm i is in the post-overstatement period, and zero otherwise. The other variables are defined in the Appendix. We calculate the t-statistics using standard errors clustered at the year and firm levels, with two-tailed t-tests. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
We employ four proxies to capture changes in corporate governance: changes in the percentage of outsiders on the board of directors, changes in the numbers of outsiders on the board, changes in whether the chief executive officer (CEO) is also the chair of the board (CEO duality), and changes in the number of committee positions held by the CEO. Multiple proxies for improved governance are desirable because of the difficulty in identifying any single metric as a superior proxy. Consistent results across several proxies should increase confidence in these proxies capturing improved governance in our particular setting. We therefore base our conclusions on the preponderance of the governance evidence. We define the test companies' governance as improved if they (1) increase the percentage of outsiders on the board, (2) increase the numbers of outsiders on the board, (3) eliminate CEO-chair duality, or (4) reduce the number of committee positions held by the CEO from the pre-to the post-restatement periods.
We investigate the association between improvement metrics and increased conservatism using both Basu's DT conservatism metric and C-Score metric. We add a dichotomous variable IMP it to the time-series model (3) and to the C-Score model previously reported in Table 6 . The variable IMP it is coded as one for an improvement in governance from the pre-to the post-periods, and zero otherwise. The corporate governance data are obtained from the Investor Responsibility Research Center database for the period 1996-2006, and the additional analyses in this section are conducted only for the subsample of companies that have the necessary governance data available from this database. The sample period is from 1996 to 2006. The models are estimated using OLS pooled regressions. The dependent variable is NI it , net income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t. The variable IMP it is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i exhibits (1) an increase in the percentage of outsiders on the board, (2) an increase in the number of outsiders on the board, (3) elimination of CEO-chair duality, or (4) a reduction in the number of committee positions held by the CEO, and zero otherwise. Changes in governance measures are identified by comparing the mean value for each governance metric during the three years after the restatement year with the mean of the metric during the overstatement period. The variable POST it is an indicator variable equal to one if year t of test firm i is in the post-restatement period, and zero otherwise. The other variables are defined in the Appendix. We calculate the t-statistics using standard errors clustered at the year and firm levels, with two-tailed t-tests. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Using a sample of 1556 test company observations, we first estimate an OLS pooled regression with Basu's DT augmented conservatism metric model (3), allowing the coefficients to vary between the improved and unimproved groups. Table 7 reports the regression estimation results. Each column of results is headed by the dimension of corporate governance investigated therein.
We find that the coefficients of POST it Â RET it Â NEG it are not significantly different from zero for any of the four governance metrics. This indicates that, absent improvement in corporate governance, conservatism generally does not increase in the post-restatement period. We find that the coefficients of POST it Â IMP it Â RET it Â NEG it generally are positive and significant. These results indicate that increases in conservatism are more prevalent in companies improving governance subsequent to restatements. The exception is the right-most column of results in Table 7 that reports no incremental effect on conservatism for test firms that decrease the number of committee positions held by the CEO.
Next, we employ the C-Score metric model to investigate whether our alternative measure of conservatism increases incrementally for test firms that improve their corporate governance. The inferences from the results of Table 8 are quite  similar to those from Table 7 . We observe no increase in conservatism for test firms with no improvement in governance subsequent to restatements (the coefficients of POST it are insignificant). However, we find that the coefficients of the interaction variables POST it Â IMP it are generally positive and significant, indicating that improved firms are associated with greater conservatism. These results are observed for three out of the four measures of improved corporate governance. The non-performing measure of improvement in governance is again a decrease in the number of committee positions held by the CEO. In summary, our results in Tables 7 and 8 are consistent with the interpretation that (i) increases in conservatism are conditional on improvements in corporate governance and (ii) the Basu DT and C-Score metrics capture changes in conservatism.
Conclusions
The concept of conservatism is consistent with economic theory and accounting practice and has led to a large body of accounting literature. Conservatism consists of income recognition policies that result in recognizing bad news (economic losses) in a timelier fashion than recognizing good news (economic gains). The most widely used measure of conservatism is Basu's (1997) DT coefficient. The usefulness of Basu's measure has been questioned by some recent papers (Dietrich et al., 2007; Givoly et al., 2007; Patoukas and Thomas, 2011) . Ball et al. (2011) note that a large number of studies report Basu estimates of DT conservatism that behave as predicted by credible theories, and the authors conclude that ''the importance of this literature, together with the advice that its results be discarded, make this issue worthy of further study'' (p. 2).
GHN (2007) provide a useful starting point for such an empirical project. GHN assume the measure is valid and then investigate whether the empirical evidence is consistent with its validity. Their approach indicates whether any bias is sufficient to render Basu-based metrics invalid in particular research settings, including an earnings restatement setting. Similar to GHN, this study investigates whether Basu-based measures of conservatism are able to detect situations in which companies' earnings are known to be significantly overstated, as revealed by subsequent restatements of earnings.
We examine whether Basu-based metrics detect changes in conservatism in companies' income numbers surrounding previous earnings overstatements. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, Basu's DT conservatism metric and the related C-Score metric reflect a lower conservatism level for restatement firms than for control firms in periods of overstated earnings. Second, both Basu-based metrics reflect increases in conservatism of test companies' earnings in periods subsequent to overstatements. The increased conservatism is evident using both a time-series approach and a cross-sectional approach. Third, increased conservatism is detectable only for test companies that improve corporate governance subsequent to restatements. Test companies that do not improve corporate governance do not exhibit increases in conservatism. Overall, these results are consistent with both Basu's (1997) DT coefficient and Khan and Watts' (2009) C-Score capturing predictable variation in conservatism around earnings overstatements.
Appendix. Variable definitions Variable Definition
NI it ¼ Net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) of firm i in year t, scaled by the market value of equity (Compustat #199nCompustat #25) at the beginning of year t. RET it ¼ Annual buy-and-hold return of firm i in year t, calculated as returns from the fourth month after the fiscal year-end in year t À 1 to the fourth month after the fiscal year-end date in year t. NEG it ¼ Indicator variable equal to one if RET it is negative, and zero otherwise. SIZE it À 1 ¼ Natural log of the market value of equity (Compustat #199nCompustat #25) at the beginning of year t. LEV it À 1 ¼ Total debt (Compustat #9 þCompustat #34) divided by total assets (Compustat #6) of firm i at the beginning of year t. MTB it À 1 ¼ Market-to-book ratio (Compustat #199nCompustat #25/Compustat #60) of firm i at the beginning of year t. LIT it À 1 ¼ Indicator variable equal to one if firm i belongs to the following industries at the beginning of year t, and zero otherwise: biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836), computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674) or retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961). C-Score it ¼ Conservatism score estimated using variables from Table 3 of Khan and Watts (2009) .
SPREAD it ¼
Average bid-ask spread of firm i in year t, scaled by the midpoint of the bid-ask spread of firm i in year t. RETVOLA it ¼ Standard deviation of daily stock returns of firm i in year t. INVCYC it ¼ Depreciation expense (Compustat #14), scaled by total assets (Compustat #6) of firm i at the beginning of year t. FIRMAGE it ¼ Age of firm i at the end of year t, measured as the number of years firm i has been listed by the Center for Research in Security Prices. LITPROB_CHG it À 1 ¼ Indicator variable equal to one if firm i's litigation probability (LITPROB) increases from year t À 1 to year t. Here LITPROB is calculated using the coefficients in Table 3 
